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the immaturity of the EU accession process at that time.
However, it is certainly reasonable to argue that it was a
mistake to disengage from Macedonia, particularly considering the then-ongoing struggles to contain the Kosovo
Liberation Army in Kosovo and Serbia.
The great weakness of the book is that it declines to
link the narrative and policy prescriptions to current
research on ethnic conflict and minority rights. The opening chapter includes a review of literature on conflict prevention, but the concepts and ideas do not play a role in
the text that follows. In particular, Ripiloski’s work would
have benefitted from a stronger comparative perspective
in order to gain leverage on the question of the way in
which international actors can play a role in inducing
majority ethnic groups to protect minority rights and
minority groups to find redress in nonviolent political
mechanisms.
Despite these weaknesses, Conflict in Macedonia makes
an important contribution to scholarly understanding of
ethnic and political processes in Macedonia. It is the only
book-length treatment of Macedonian politics that has
been released since the cessation of hostilities. The richness of the fieldwork and clarity of exposition makes it an
essential work for scholars of Macedonia and the Balkan
region.

those in the know. A US official, Susan Crawford, dismissed legal proceedings against a Guantanamo prisoner
because he had been tortured; his interrogation was supervised by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, among
others. The cautious and credible International Committee of the Red Cross concluded, on the basis of its interviews with former CIA detainees, that they had been
subjected to torture or cruel treatment in secret prisons.
Space does not permit references to US policy toward prisoners in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. So we are not
focused here on “bad apples” who engaged in mistreatment in excess of policy guidelines, but rather authorization of policy at the highest levels.
The long introduction by the editors does indeed survey the options available for a response, and sometimes
provides interesting background—for example, reminding us that at the Nuremberg trials, the Altsttoer case
established that “legal advisors who prepare legal advice
that is so erroneous as to give rise to an international
crime are themselves subject to the rules of international
criminality” (quoted at p. 11). This could be seen as having relevance to the lawyers in the US Department of
Justice who provided the so-called torture memos that
enabled the Bush policies of torture and cruelty that
followed.
Some chapters, like the one by Claire Finkelstein on
“Vindicating the Rule of Law,” are complex and dense
and perhaps suitable for other law professors. In their introduction, the editors need no fewer than eight paragraphs
to try to summarize her views. On the other hand, the
chapter by Daniel Herwitz on abuse of prisons at the
Guantanamo Naval Base, and the possible responses by
various actors, is a much shorter think piece, with only
seven reference notes (Finkelstein had 42).
To focus on another example, the chapter on universal
jurisdiction by Lisa Hajjar is a clear summary of the concept and is perhaps useful for undergraduate readers wanting an introductory overview, but it presents little that is
new or thought provoking for those already familiar with
the concept.
For this reviewer, the most striking chapter is by Stephen Holmes on “The Spider’s Web: How Government
Lawbreakers Routinely Elude the Law.” With penetrating
insight that some might term critical realism, the author
explains why successful prosecution of Bush officials in
US courts is highly unlikely—which, no doubt, explains
one reason why President Barack Obama and his attorney
general have not been much interested in pursuing that
option. Holmes, noting that the law is made by elites
with an eye to protecting those elites, points out not only
that governmental officials in the Executive Branch have
the defense of sovereign immunity against prosecution.
They also have the defense of acting in good faith consistent with legal memos once issued by the Office of Legal
Counsel in the Department of Justice, however erroneous
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This edited collection by Austin Sarat and Nasser Hussain
starts by noting that during the George W. Bush administration, there were charges of violation of law regarding
domestic surveillance, the invasion of Iraq, and the policy
toward enemy prisoners. It then examines the question of
why prosecutions and/or a truth commission have not
occurred on any of these subjects, given that the United
States is supposedly committed to the rule of law in which
protection of human rights is supposed to loom large. The
editors themselves do not take a clear position on these
matters but say rather that they wish to analyze various
views. The contributing authors, all from leading academic institutions in the United States, have written chapters that are disparate and in some ways uneven. The book
focuses for the most part on prisoner issues.
Those who follow the subject closely know that the
Bush administration adopted a policy of torture and cruelty toward certain enemy prisoners after 9/11. We know
this not only because of the outside commentary of human
rights organizations, activists, and scholars, not to mention journalists, but also because of inside commentary by
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those opinions may be. Even further, he notes that high
officials can avail themselves of the argument of state secrets;
the higher the official, the more that official can say that
proper defense against charges of illegality requires the
release of documents that the court should not pursue lest
vital national security interests be compromised. US courts
have often proven sympathetic to such claims.
To summarize his lengthy and wide-ranging analysis,
Holmes is highly skeptical that national legal proceedings
could effectively punish high officials who authorized torture (or aggression or illegal domestic surveillance). He
argues that at the end of the day, law in the United States
effectively does not control—and cannot punish—political
elites who claim that they are acting in the interest of
national security. He argues that persons like Vice President Dick Cheney and his key aide David Addington
knew exactly how law and politics work in this country,
took the necessary steps to protect themselves from legal
accountability, and are—and will remain—beyond the
reach of US law. His is a persuasive analysis.
That leaves open the possibility of US officials being
prosecuted in foreign courts under universal jurisdiction,
but few are the foreign officials who want to pursue such
proceedings given the importance and power of the United
States. As demonstrated by recent events in both Belgium
and Spain, when foreign states start down this road, the
United States is not hesitant to apply pressure to divert
the process, with many foreign officials reluctant to elevate this kind of criminal justice over good relations with
Washington.
As for the option of some sort of truth commission,
perhaps along the lines of the bipartisan 9/11 Commission in the United States or the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, many things might be said
but only one will be noted here. It took the United States
more than 40 years to apologize and pay reparations for
the wrongful internment of Japanese and Japanese Americans, and their arbitrary loss of property, during World
War II. That was long after the end of the war and the
demise of the Japanese threat—which, incidentally, was
never very great on the mainland’s West Coast, as correctly perceived by any number of security officials at that
time. It is likely to be some time, if ever, before the United
States adopts a similar mea culpa with regard to such matters as torture after 9/11. Most likely any candid review of
such US policies would occur after the demise of further
attacks by extremist Islamic elements. As long as there are
prospects for further attacks, something like 40% of Americans tend to elevate harsh security policies over prohibitions on torture (depending, of course, on how various
questions are worded). As numerous observers have noted,
any candid inquiry now would add to the already polarized and poisonous political culture extant in Washington.
In the final analysis, the Holmes chapter alone is worth
the price of the book.
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Let me be clear upfront: This book is a must-read for
anyone interested in bargaining, conflict, and/or deterrence. Branislav Slantchev makes a significant contribution to the literature by drawing our attention to a largely
neglected aspect of crisis bargaining, that is, as a process
that can alter the incentive structures of the involved parties and, most importantly, their expected payoffs from
war. How can we credibly persuade opponents not to fight
while also influencing them into desirable (for us) behavior? The bargaining literature generally addresses this question from an informational perspective, examining which
strategies can best manipulate the opponent’s beliefs about
our own likely behavior. The role of bargaining moves is
therefore strictly informational. The author correctly points
out that a principal limitation of this tradition is the implied
premise that an actor’s incentives remain constant throughout the crisis. In contrast, bargaining is arguably as much
about altering the opponent’s and our own preferences for
peace and war as it is about manipulating the opponent’s
beliefs about our preferences. Remarkably, this facet of
crisis bargaining has eluded much of extant research.
Slantchev’s book therefore introduces an entirely novel
formulation of the bargaining process.
To develop substantive propositions about bargaining
as a process that creates and alters (rather than just communicates) commitments, the book uses game-theoretic
models with one illustrative case study (the Korean War,
Chapter 6). At the very outset (Chapter 1), Slantchev
makes an excellent case for formal-theoretic treatments of
crisis bargaining. While acknowledging the necessity to
abstract away the multitude of empirical facets in order to
focus on the essential features of a crisis, he also effectively
rebuffs standard objections to rational choice theory. Moreover, the book is accessible to all readers, regardless of
their methodological background. To be sure, his formal
stylizations are at the most sophisticated level and should
attract the attention of every game theorist in this area. It
should be equally attractive to those less familiar with
formal models, because much of technical discussion is
relegated to well-organized appendices, and the narrative
is clear throughout. The author carefully explains relevant
game-theoretic terms and formal derivations, discusses the
intuition behind them in the context of his argument,
and abundantly illustrates with historical anecdotes; all of
this is accomplished with unusual ease. Stylistically, then,
the book should serve as a model for game-theorists who
want to speak to all research communities.
At the core of Slantchev’s argument is the conception of
crisis bargaining through inherently costly military moves
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